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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
except as their rights arc modified by their peculiar contracts, are protected
by law as other seamen . . .,21
In summary, then, a lay fisherman engaged in the business of* com-
mercial fishing on navigable waters is enough of a seaman to entitle him,
in case of injury or sickness in the service of his vessel, to his wages
according to the contract.- ' lie is entitled to the benefits of maintenance
and cure.212  His rights are enforceable in admiralty like any other seaman's
rights.2 13  He is a ward of the admiralty court. 14  He is a seaman in
practically every respect except that of a secured periodic wages and
statutory enactments listed supra.
CONCLUSION
'lis lay plan which once dominated the shipping empire has now
been relegated to the relatively small sphere of fishing. Although thousands
of ships and fishermen arc still affected by these lay principles there seems
to be very little recent adjudication on the subject. 'lie existing litigation,
and the rules thereby promulgated, are largely of sparse and ancient
vintage.
We submit this comment in the hope that it will, in some degree,
systematize and clarify a rather complex and neglected field.
ARTUR J. FRANZA and
NORTON H. SCHWARTZ
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT-
EFFECTS OF REPUDIATION
INTRODUCTION
The man who wrongfully renounces a contract into which he
has deliberately entered cannot justly complain if lie is immediately
sued for compensation in damages by the man whom he has
injured.-
One phase of contract law that has plagued the courts of both England
and the United States for the last century is the doctrine of anticipatory
breach. The problem involved is one of importance because where the
theory has been accepted and applied, there has been an enlargement of
the contractual obligation.-' The rights of parties are affected by such a
condition. Upon invocation, the doctrine causes a party to be held liable
210. See The Montague. 53 V. Sitpp. 548. ;49 (\VD. Wash. 1943),
211. The Montague, 53 F. Supp. 48 (WV.D, Wash. 1043).
212. See Maintenance and cure, supra.
213. The Montague, 53 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. \Wash. 194).
214. Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6,047 (C.C.D, MY, 1823j.
215. Sec note 26 supra.
1. Hochster v. De La Tour. 2 El. & BI., 6S3, 118 Eng. Rep. 922, 927(Q. B. 1853).
2. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrs § 1321 (Rev. Ed, 1937).
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on a promise he never made? Since the promisor only promised to do
something at a future time, should strict legal principles be relaxed in
order to hold him liable on a contract because of his action before that
time arrives? The purpose of this comment will be to determine by which
means that obligation has been expanded-both generally, and in Florida
specifically-and what effect it has had upon our system of jurisprudence.
Strictly construed, an anticipator%, breach is one committed before the
time of performance has arrived In order for the adverse party to treat
th renunciation as a total breach. the refusal to perform must be of the
whole contract or of a covenant going to the whole consideration, and it
must be distinct, unequivocal and absolute.5 An actual breach of contract,
on the other hand, consists of a failure, without legal excuse, to perform
any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract which is no
longer executory 6  An anticipatory breach occurs when there is a repudiation
of an existing executory contract yet to be performed by either party.
In the event one of the parties does perform, no matter the extent of
such performance, the breach is said to be actual rather than anticipatory.
This innovation (the doctrine of anticipatory breach) in the common law
was introduced in 1853 by a famous English case, Hochster v. De La Tour.7
An action was brought for breach of a personal service contract by the
employee. While the agreement was wholly executory, the employer
renounced his promise. It was held that the action was properly and not
prematurely brought. The reasoning behind the decision was that an
unfortunate situation would have arisen if the employee, as a condition
precedent to a right of action, would have to decline other employment
and hold himself ready to perform his promise until the commencement
date of the contract.
It would seem that a later English decision, allowing suit fori total
breach because of a repudiation, found footing upon firmer ground by
reasoning that there is an implied promise to keep the contract open as
subsisting and effective until the moment of performance."
3. Ibid.
4. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936); See 5 WI.LISTO-,-,
CONTRACTS § 1296 (Rev. Ed. 1937).
5. Roehm v. Ilorst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900); Dinglcy v. Olcr, 117 U.S. 49 (1886).6. 5 W[L.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 1288 (Rev. Ed. 1937). In order to cover the
case of anticipatory breach, the somewhat wider definition is given in RrSTATFr.NT,
CONTRACTS § 312 (1932) (" . . . non-performance of any contractual duty of
immediate performance.").
7. 2 El. & Bl. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
8. Ibid. The court's reasoning was based upon two earlier English cases, Caines
v. Smith, 35 M. & W. 189, 153 Eng. Rep. 816 (1846). where the defendant's promise
was alleged to be simply to marry the plantiff, and Short v. Stone, 8 Q.B. 358, 115 Eng.Rep. 911 (1846), where the defendant was to mar' her within a reasonable time
next after lie should thiereunto be requested. The two cases did not profess to
establish any genleral doctrine that a contract could be broken before the time for its
performance, but they gave rise to the court's conception that either the plaintiff
have an immediate right of action or lie would have none. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS§ 1313 (Rev. Ed. 1937).
9. Frost v. Knight, L.R. 7 Ex. 111 (1872).
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The doctrine announced in the above case became the settled law
in England regarding contracts for services, for marriage and for the
manufacture of goods.' 0 As will be observed presently, the majority of the
courts of the United States reacted similarly.
At this point, it might be helpful to note that the doctrine of
anticipatory breach does not apply to holders of promissory notes, bills of
exchange or bonds."
In the case of an ordinary money contract, such as a promissory note,
or a bond, the consideration has passed; there are no mutual obligations.12
The law is settled also in regard to unilateral contracts. ".. Thne
doctrine of anticipatory breach has in general no application to unilateral
contracts, and particularly to such contracts for the payment of money
only ... ."14
There is a split of authority in applying the doctrine to contracts for
the use of land. In view of the contingent character of rent, as an
obligation not owing in the present but payable in the future, it has
generally been stated that there can be no such thing as an anticipatory
breach of a lease.1 ' The theory. upon which this contention rests is
apparently that application of the doctrine would render enforceable,
claims for rent as an obligation absolutely owing which obligation might
never come into existence.' 6
The opposite view has been taken, however, allowing the lessor to
recover damages in advance.17  rbh damages have been for the total
breach where the lessee has repudiated.b In most cases (though not in all)
the damages have been measured by the difference between the rent
10. Frost v. Knight, L.R. 7 Ex. 111 (1872); Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q.B.D.
460 (1886); Synge v. Synge, I .Q.B. 466 (1894).
11. Rochin v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900); Greenway v. Gaither, 10 Fed. Cas.
1180. No. 5,788 (C.C.D. Md. 1853). But cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas,
297 U.S. 672 (1936). See Washington County v. Williams, 111 Fed. 801 (8th Cir.
1901), which was an extension of the Rochn holding; the case went too far, stating
that Roehm v. Horst stood for the proposition that the doctrine of anticipatory breach
was not applicable to a contract to pay money in the future.
12. Rochin v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 8 (1900).
13. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900); Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N.Y.
471, 33 N.E. 561 (1893). See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1328 (Rev. Ed. 1937);
Note Anticipatory Breach of Unilateral Contracts, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 112 (1951).
14. Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 333 (19371.
15. People ex rel. Nelson v. West Town State Bank, 373 II. 106, 25 N.E.2d 509
(1940); Cooper v. Casco Mercantile Trust Co., 134 Me. 372, 186 At]. 885 (1936);
Wood v. Partridge, Ii Mass. 448 (1914).
16. People ex Tel. Nelson v. \Vest Town State Baik, 373 Ill. 106, 25 N.E.2d V0§
(1940); cf, Nlosqs v. Autuono, 56 Fla. 499, 500, 47 So. 925, 926 (1908), where it
appears that Florida follows the theory that in leases there -is an actual breach .once
the contract has been executed but. prior to the time of performance.
17.'-lawkinson v. Johnton. 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 314 U.S.
694 (1941). But ef Sagamore.Corp. v. Villcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 Atl. 464 (1935).
where it is stated that there was, in fact, an actual breach.
18, Arden Hotel Co. v. Mills, 20 Manitoba L.R. 14 (1910); cf. Wilson v.
National Ref. Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 Pac. 941 (1928).
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reserved in the lease for the unexpired term and the reasonable rental
value of such term. 19
Where the doctrine is recognized, its application is normally confined
to contracts which contain mutually executory terms. 20 It has no application
to a contract in which the complaining party has fully performed.2 '
The foregoing is typical of most authorities. However, the view that
the full performance of a contract by the complaining party does not
prevent his recovery upon the doctrine has received some support.22  This
might very easily be the result of the court's failure to distinguish between
an actual and an anticipatory breach, evidenced by the case of Pollack v.
Pollack. 23 The court stated the principle: ". . . even though one side of
the contract was fully performed, if a promisor breached (by repudiation)
lie would be breaching the contract just as effectively as if both sides
remained to be performed .... _24
The doctrine of anticipatory breach should not have been applied since
there was merely a question of the extent of an actual breach and not a
question concerning the type of breach that occurred.
Naturally, in all instances where the action of breach of contract lies
for anticipatory repudiation, there must be an election by the injured
party to treat the contract as broken. '-? If the injured party does not
elect, then, so far as that particular repudiation is concerned, the contract
remains in effect for the benefit of both parties.26
Many vexatious problems were to arise in the growth of the doctrine.
Strangely enough, howcver, the problem child i.e., what shall constitute
the breach or repudiation, came into existence with the features of a
cherub. Under Hochster Y. De La Tour,27 an absolute refusal was deemed
all that was necessary to institute the action. Although the Hochster
decision, as was stated previously, was enunciated in 1853, the United
States Supreme Court did not entertain the question until 1900. The
19. Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927); cf. Marathon
Oil Co. v. Edwards, 96 S.W.2d 551 ('Fex. Civ. App. 1936).
20. Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 240 U.S. 581
(1916); Rochm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900); Brimner v. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d 437
(10th Cir. 1936); See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1296 (Rev. Ed. 1937).
21. Brimmer v. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1936).
22. Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pac. Ry., 244 F. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); cf.
Magnusen v. Klemp, 339 Iil. App. 179, 89 N.E.2d 533 (1949). See Federal Life
Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1926) (dissenting opinion).
23. 39 S.W.Zd 853 (Tex. Com. App. 1931).
24. Id. at 855.
25. Remy v. Olds, 88 Cal. 537, 26 Pac. 355 (1891); Carlisle v. Green, 131 S.W.
1140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); cf. Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F.2d 488
(10th Cir. 1930); Independent Milling Co. v. Howe Scale Co. of Illinois, 105 Kan. 87,
181 Pac. 554 (1919).
26. Carlisle v. Green, 131 S.W. 1140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). But cf. Kuhlman
v. Wieben, 129 Iowa 188, 105 N.W. 445 (1905).
27. 2 El. & B1. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
28. Roehm v. Hlorst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900).
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majority of the state courts, however, whenever the question did arise,
adopted the English rule. -9
Judge Wells, in Daniels Y. Newton,a expressed opposition to the rule
in Hochster v. De La Tour31 :
An executory contract ordinarly confers no title or interest in
the subject matter of the agreement. Until the time arrives when,
by the terms of the agreement, he is or might be entitled to its
performance, lie can suffer no injury or deprivation which can
form a ground of damages. There is neither violation of rights,
nor loss upon which to found an action. The true rule seems
to us to be that in order to charge one in damages for breach of
an executory personal contract, the other party must show a
refusal or neglect to perform, at a time when and under such
conditions such that he is or might be entitled to require per-
formance .... 31
In addition he stated:
. . . The conduct of the defendant is no wrong to the plaintiff
until it actually invades sonic right of his. Actual injury and not
anticipated injury is the ground of legal recovery . ...
And in final condemnation:
. I . Throughout the whole discussion in Hochster v. De La
Tour . . . the question as to what conduct of the defendant
will relieve the plaintiff from the necessity of showing readiness
and an offer to perform at the day, in order to make out a breach
by the other, appears to us to be confounded with that of the
plaintiff's cause of action; or rather, the question, in what consists
the plaintiff's cause of action, is lost sight of; the court is dealing
only with the conduct of the defendant in repudiating the obliga-
tions of his contract .... 84
Another of the judge's contentions was that the application of the
rule in the case would necessitate the adoption of the doctrine to bonds,
notes and bills of exchange. The reason that this hypothesis is fallacious
has already been stated.
Stanford v. McGiIlW' also cxpressed the minority renunciation rule
until overruled by Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley" in 1915. The court felt
disposed to go along with the majority rule and stated:
XVhen Stanford v. McGill was decided there may have been some
doubt about what the trend of authority might be in the future,
but the contrary rule has been unanimously followed, and the
29. By 1915, Massachusetts, Nebraska and North Dakota were the only states
diametrically opposed to the doctrine. See Note, A Century \Vithout Anticipatory
Breach in 84assachusetts, 31 B.U.L. Ii:'. 505 (1951).
30. 114 Mass. 530 (1874).
31. 2 El. & BI. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
32. Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 533 (1874).
33. Id. at 539.
34, Ibid.
35. 6 N.D. 536, 72 N.W. 938 (1897).
36. 31 N.D. 130, 153 N.W. 137 (1915).
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law generally applicable to executory sale contracts settled in
harmony therewith . . . no harm can coie from harmonizing the
law in this jurisdiction with that generally prevailing . . .
Before we examine the Florida view, the thorn in the heels of the
majority, it would seem advisable to peruse the treatment other jurisdictions
have given to renunciation and repudiation. Different jurisdictions fail to
appreciate the pronounced distinction between a verbal repudiation and
a renunciation by means of a positive act, which, however, is relatively
minor, compared to the overall problem. Gcenerally, a repudiation or
renunciation has amounted to a positive statement by the promisor that
he will not or cannot39 perform.
An unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract, though
the performance thereof is vet not due, may, if the renunciation
goes to the whole contract, be treated as a complete breach which
will entitle the injured party to bring his action at once .... 41
It has amounted also to a positive act resultant in his non-performance;
i.e., such as transferring the property involved in the contract to a third
party prior to date of performance. 4'
Where a vendor, who has contracted to convey land upon the
payment of certain amounts, before the time for payment arrives,
notifies the purchaser that he will not carry out the contract,
and sells the same land to a third party, lie thereby breaches the
contract, and the purchaser may immediately sue for breach
thereof .... 42
In addition, rendering the performance impossible by becoming bankrupt,
has been held a renunciation.43
As can be readily observed, renunciation is to a great degree a question
of fact and each case must rest separately upon its merits.
THE RULE IN FLOIDA
The leading case on anticipatory breach in Florida is Slaughter v.
Barnett,44 where an action was brought by the vendee upon the vendor's
statement to the effect that he would iot perform his promise to sell a
parcel of land. The Court determined that a mere announcement of
inability or lack of desire to perform was not sufficient to constitute a
breach of contract. The act amounting to a repudiation must "distinctly,
unequivocally and absolutely" appear.45  It was necessary for the breach
to be accompanied by some act amounting, in substance, to an actual
breach.46  Under this reasoning, the purchaser (vendee) could not treat
37. Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley, 31 N.D. 130, 113, 133 NAN". 1;7, 140 (1915).
38. Roehm v. llorst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900).
39. Stanley v. Anthony Farms, 93 Fla. 295, 112 So. 57 (1927).
40. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. I, 9 (1900).
41. Pearce v. Hubbard, 223 Ala. 231, 135 So. 179 (1931).
42. Id. at 180.
43. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 240 U.S. 581 (1916).
44. 114 F1a. 352, 154 So. 134 (1934). See Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156
So. 146 (1934) (citing principal case).
45. Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 356, 154 So. 134, 138 (1934).
46. Ibid.
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the contract as breached in toto, and bring his action immediately for
damages on a total breach. The foregoing case created a rift among the
authorities on the question of whether or not the doctrine of anticipatory
breach is recognized in Florida.47
The Florida Court, in sustaining its position, maintained that the
United States Supreme Court never recognized anticipatory breach. (Citing
Dingley v. Oler"8 ) - This was by no means accurate, however, because 14 years
after the decision cited of the highest Court, and 34 years before the Slaughter
case, the United States Supreme Court, in Roehn. v. Horst,", joined other
authorities in the Western World by recognizing and sanctioning this
doctrine.
The Slaughter case was the result of an accretion of rules laid down
under a variety of factual situations in Florida. Often, in this jurisdiction
as well as in many others, anticipatory and actual breach have been
confused. From an observation of the cases it seems that many times
the courts fall into the pitfall of failing to distinguish between anticipatory
breach and the extent of damages incurred as the result of an actual
breach. 0 In Dingley v. Oler,5' the complaining party had completely
performed, and though the case was reversed on other grounds it shows
how little attention might be given to the doctrine when necessity and
convenience dictate. However, Florida's Supreme Court satisfactorily
distinguished between the two concepts from the onset. Where the
contract had been partially performed, it was decided that Hochster v.
i.e La Tour 2 was not controlling. The next rule invoked concerned
verbal repudiation prior to the time fixed for performance, 13 the one
ultimately adopted in the Slaughter case. Shortly thereafter, however, verbal
repudiation plus disposal of the property involved did amount to sufficient
repudiation.54 The two foregoing cases, Hall v. Northern and Southern
Co.,"" and Stanley v. Anthony Farms0 are distinguishable upon the facts,
however. In the Hall case there was a clause within the contract which
was relied upon to prevent the repudiation from being considered
"unequivocal." Insufficient title, which made performance impossible, 7
was a sufficient repudiation, and bad faith on the part of the vendor
caused the bending of a general rule of damages. 8 At one stage a mere
47. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1316 (Rev. Ed. 1937); 6 GRISMORE, CONTRACIS
§ 287 (2d. ed. 1947); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 959 (1951).
48. 117 U.S. 490 (1886).
49. 178 U.S. 1 (1900).
50. Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490 (1886); See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1317
page 2367 (Rev. Ed. 1937).
51. 117 U.S. 490 (1886).
52. 2 El. & B1. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
53. Hall v. Northern and Southern Co., 55 Fla. 235, 46 So. 178 (1908).
54. Stanley v. Anthony Farms, 93 Fla. 295, 112 So. 57 (1927).
55. 55 Fla. 235, 46 So. 178 (1908).
56. 93 Fla. 295, 112 So. 57 (1927).
57. Thomas v. Walden, 57 Fla. 2134, 48 So. 746 (1909); Dral Investment Co.
v. Stockton, 54 Fla. 296, 45 So. 497 (1907).
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verbal repudiation was sufficient to invoke the doctrine of anticipatory
breach,59 but the rule was extinguished With the birth of the Slaughter
decision. Since that time, regardless of the renunciation, the same
requirements have been specified, although the Court has inferred that
the doctrine is recognized in Florida. 0
CONCLUSION
The practical convenience of the doctrine has been the most significant
reason for its almost universal acceptance-the ability of the plaintiff to
dispose of his action (as long as it is certain he is to have an action)
at once. The fact that the doctrine has enlarged the obligation of the
law of contracts, however, is also to be considered.0 ' The writer would
favor the Florida view if the promisee never changed his position between
the time of repudiation and the date of performance. This, however, is
very seldom the situation, and when the promisor's wrongful action has
placed the promisee at a disadvantage, there should be a method of
correcting the wrong. Also, as was stated previously, since the breach is
determined by facts involved in each particular case, if a contract were not
to be performed until a distant date, bringing rules of evidence into play
to determine the extent of the renunciation might easily lend itself to
great difficulty. To expedite progress, our laws should stay in step with
the needs of commerce. The doctrine of anticipatory breach can and does
enhance contract law. Even though the doctrine also enlarges contract




ELEMENTS OF AN ESCROW
Although escrows play an important part in modem legal affairs,
comparatively little litigation has arisen on the point. The attributes of an
escrow were established early at English common law, and have been
relatively unchanged by the passage of time.
An escrow has been technically defined as an instrument which by its
terms, imports a legal obligation, and which is deposited by the grantor
with a third party to be kept by the depositary until the performance of a
condition, or the happening of a certain event; and then to be delivered
to the grantee.1 While the term escrow originally applied only to real estate
58. Key v. Alexander, 91 Fla. 975, 108 So. 883 (1926); rf. Liberis v. Carmeris,
107 Fla. 352, 146 So. 220 (1932).
59. Behrman v. Max, 102 Fla. 1094, 137 So. 120 (1931).
60. Gilliland v. Mercantile Investment and Holding Co., 147 Fla. 613, 3 So.2d
148 (1941).
61. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1321 (Rev. Ed. 1937).
1. Love v. Brown Development Co. of Mich., 100 Fla. 1373, 131 So. 144 (1930).
